ht a battle next day under so many
disadvantages that ruinous defeat, with the probable loss of the army,
was staring him in the face. It would be interesting to know what
Schofield then thought about his intimate knowledge of Hood's character,
and his cool calculation based thereon, for which he afterwards so
unblushingly claimed so much credit.

The two trains stood at the station until daylight was beginning to dawn
when a detail of men came and began to build fires to burn the cars, but
the detail was driven away, and the fires were extinguished before much
damage was done, by the advance of the enemy. The two trains thus
captured afforded the transportation to which Hood alluded in a letter
to Richmond, written when he was in front of Nashville, wherein he
stated that he had captured enough transportation to make use of the
railroad in bringing up supplies. But Schofield ignored the loss of the
two trains, for, in his official report, he explicitly states that with
the exception of a few wagons, and of a few cattle that were stampeded,
he arrived at Franklin without any loss.

When Schofield "pushed on with Ruger's division to ascertain the
condition of affairs," on his arrival at Thompson's Station, three miles
north of Spring Hill, he found camp fires still burning, but the
brigade of cavalry that had been in possession there, withdrew without
making any resistance. This very considerate action on the part of the
cavalry was another of those lucky fatalities that so notably
contributed to the escape of our army when such special fatalities were
a vital necessity for its escape. After posting Ruger there to hold the
cross roads Schofield returned to Spring Hill, where he arrived about
midnight at the same time with the advance of Cox's division coming from
Duck river. With this division he then hurried through to Franklin,
picking up Ruger as he passed along, and thus saddling Stanley with all
the risk of saving the artillery and the trains.

If they had been lost Stanley would have been the scapegoat, but with
the same skill with which that afternoon he had bluffed off ten-twelfths
of Hood's army with a single division, Stanley that night saved the
artillery and the trains. At 3 o'clock in the morning, when only a part
of the trains had pulled out, the long column on the pike was brought to
a standstill by an attack some place in front. The situation was so
critical that General Wood, who was then with Stanley,