may have been given were spoken in a low tone
at the head of the column. You would be apprised that the column was
moving by the silent disappearance in the darkness of your file leader.
You would hurry after him, and taking, perhaps, not more than a dozen
steps, would be brought to a sudden halt by running against him,
immediately followed by the man in your rear bumping up against
yourself. Then would follow an indefinite wait until the column would
again move on a short distance. The wearing suspense of the long
waiting, while standing on our feet; the exasperating halts following
those false starts, when everybody was almost frantic with impatience to
go on; the excessive physical fatigue, combined with the intense mental
strain when already haggard from much loss of sleep during the three
days and nights preceding, make that night memorable as by far the most
trying in nearly four years of soldiering. It afforded unspeakable
relief when, just as daylight was beginning to dawn, our column finally
got away in rapid motion for Franklin, the enemy dogging our heels with
their close pursuit.

The location of Hood's headquarters was central as to the position of
his troops until nightfall, and was, therefore, a proper one. But he was
too far away to get any personal knowledge as to what was going on at
Spring Hill, and he had to rely on the reports of his subordinates who
were in contact with our troops. The character of those reports is
unmistakably indicated by the second move that Hood made. His first
move, as has been shown, was based on the correct theory that a part of
Schofield's army was at Spring Hill and a part at Duck river, and it
contemplated thrusting in Cheatham's corps between those two parts. His
second move, made after the fighting was all over, and he had received
the reports of that fighting, was based on the theory that all of
Schofield's army had reached Spring Hill, for, abandoning all purpose of
cutting off any part south of Spring Hill, it contemplated seizing the
pike north of Spring Hill and cutting off Schofield's retreat to
Franklin.

Between sunset and dark, as stated by General Stewart, which would be
about 5 o'clock at that season of the year, he received orders to cross
Rutherford's creek with his corps, to pass to the right of Cheatham's
corps, and to extend his right across the Franklin pike. After about
five hours Stewart finally went into bivouac with his right more than a
mile awa