y from the Franklin pike. His explanations for his failure were
the lack of a competent guide, the darkness of the night, and the
fatigue of his men. To accomplish Hood's orders required a march of a
little less than four miles by Stewart's head of column--about three
miles by a direct country road leading into the Mount Carmel road, and
the remaining distance across the country lying between the Mount Carmel
road and the Franklin pike. It would seem that a guide might have been
found among the cavalry who had explored the country that afternoon in
developing the position of our line between the Mount Carmel road and
the railway station, west of the Franklin pike; or there were men in
some of the Tennessee regiments whose homes were in that vicinity, who
were thoroughly familiar with the ground. That no great difficulties
were involved in the march is proved by the fact that Johnson's division
made a similar march in about two hours, later in the night, to get into
position on Bate's left. The night was as dark, the men were as tired,
the distance was as great, and the way was as difficult for Johnson as
for Stewart. In view of these plain facts it is a fair inference that
Stewart made a very lukewarm effort to accomplish Hood's orders; that it
was possible for him, by a display of no more energy than Johnson
displayed, to have extended his right across the Franklin pike as early
as 8 o'clock, and then when Schofield started north with Ruger's
division about 9 o'clock, he would have found the way effectually
barred.

The prime cause of Hood's failure was apparently the lack of confidence
in his generalship on the part of so many of his subordinates. They had
been dissatisfied with his appointment to the command of the army, and
their dissatisfaction had been greatly increased by the failure of his
attacks on Sherman's lines in front of Atlanta. With the poor opinion
they held of Hood's ability it was not possible for them to give to any
plan of his that whole-hearted, unquestioning support that gives the
best guarantee of success. Simple as his plan was, they all failed to
grasp the importance of getting possession of the pike and, Cleburne
excepted, they all acted as if they were expecting a repetition of the
disastrous experience that had followed the attacks on Sherman. The
promptness with which Cleburne turned and rolled up Bradley's brigade
when he was so unexpectedly assailed on his own flank, was the only
energet