ome distance in column, then
fronted into line and advanced to a farm fence paralleling the pike at a
distance variously stated at from 80 to 100 yards. His line there halted
and laid down behind the fence. Cleburne and Granbury were both killed
next day, and it is not known why Granbury did not go on and take
possession of the pike. The brigades of Lowrey and Govan had become so
badly mixed up in the pursuit of Bradley, and in the recoil from the
fire of the battery, that their line had to be reformed. When this was
accomplished the intrepid Cleburne was about to resume his attack
towards Spring Hill when he was stopped by an order from Cheatham, who
had brought up Brown's division on Cleburne's right, and had also sent a
staff officer to recall Bate with an order for him to close up and
connect with Cleburne's left. This proves that developments, probably
the fire of so many guns opening on Cleburne, had convinced Cheatham
that the force holding Spring Hill was strong enough to demand the
attention of his entire corps. His intention was for Brown to lead in an
attack, Cleburne to follow Brown, and Bate, when he got up, to follow
Cleburne. But on getting into position Brown reported to Cheatham that
he was out-flanked several hundred yards on his right, and that it would
lead to inevitable disaster for him to attack. The 97th Ohio, of Lane's
brigade, was to the left of the battery, in front of Spring Hill, with
the left of the 97th extending towards Mount Carmel road. The 100th
Illinois was on the other side of the road, several hundred yards in
advance of the 97th Ohio, and the two regiments were connected by a part
of the 40th Indiana deployed as skirmishers. That was the force that
paralyzed the action of Brown's veteran division. Cheatham then directed
Brown to refuse his right brigade to protect his flank, and to attack
with the rest of his division, but Brown, still hesitating, Cheatham
then concluded that the force holding Spring Hill was too strong for his
corps alone to attack, for he reported to Hood that the line in his
front was too long for him, and that Stewart's corps must first come up
and form on his right. But before Stewart could get up, night had come.

It is notable that Brown's only excuse for not attacking was that he was
out-flanked on his right, for the claim has been made that Hood arrived
in front of Spring Hill too late in the day to accomplish anything, and
Schofield himself has stated that