ard from Stanley
that Hood was attacking at Spring Hill.

After the campaign Schofield claimed that its success was due to his
intimate knowledge of Hood's character, gained while they were
classmates at West Point, which enabled him to foresee what Hood would
do under any given conditions, and then make the best dispositions for
defeating him. When, two months later, Schofield was in Washington,
where they knew nothing about the details of the campaign, he so
successfully impressed his claim on the Administration that he was given
the same promotion with which General Sheridan had been rewarded for the
victory at Winchester, jumping at one bound from the rank of captain to
that of brigadier-general in the regular army. But it is plain that
after five hours' of deliberation that morning Schofield had reached a
wrong conclusion as to Hood's intention, for if "Actions speak louder
than words," there can be no question that Schofield's dispositions were
made under the conviction that Hood would march down the river, after
crossing, to clear the way for Lee to cross. And so deeply infatuated
was he with this self-imposed delusion that, disregarding the order of
Thomas and the advice of Wilson, he cherished it for about five hours
after Post had reported that Hood was marching towards Spring Hill.

Wagner's advance, double-quicking through Spring Hill at noon, and
deploying just beyond on a run, interposed barely in time to head off
the advance of Hood's cavalry, Wagner arriving by the Columbia pike from
the southwest and the cavalry by the Mount Carmel road from the east.
General Forrest, commanding Hood's cavalry, had used his superior
numbers so skillfully as to push back Wilson with our cavalry just north
of Mount Carmel, which is five miles east of Spring Hill, before noon.
Leaving one brigade to watch Wilson, Forrest then crossed over to Spring
Hill with all the rest of his three divisions of cavalry. If Wagner had
arrived a few minutes later he would have found Forrest in possession at
Spring Hill.

General Cox, in his book on this campaign, claims that General Wilson
committed a grave error in not crossing over to Spring Hill, in advance
of Forrest, with all our cavalry. But in justice to Wilson it must be
remembered that at Mount Carmel he acted under the belief that Schofield
was following the advice he had given early that morning. If Schofield
had been at Spring Hill at 10 o'clock, as Wilson had advised, with a