word which has not yet been and probably never will
be used. But the negation of individual is universal; "impersonal,"
therefore, according to the usage of these writers, becomes equivalent
to universal.

But, secondly, even after the use of terms has become thus understood,
and we are no longer confused over the words, having arrived at the
idea they are intended to convey, the idea itself is fundamentally
erroneous. I freely admit that there is an interesting truth of which
these writers have got a glimpse and to which they are striving to
give expression, but apparently they have not understood the real
nature of this truth and consequently they are fundamentally wrong in
calling the Far East "impersonal," even in their sense of the word.
They are furthermore in error, in ascribing this "impersonal"
characteristic of the Japanese to their inherent race nature, If they
are right, the problem is fundamentally one of biological evolution.

In contrast to this view, it is here contended, first, that the
feature they are describing is not such as they describe it; second,
that it is not properly called "impersonality"; third, that it is not
a matter of inherent race nature, of brain structure, or of mind
differentiation, but wholly a matter of social evolution; and, fourth,
that if there is such a trait as they describe, it is not due to a
deficiently developed but on the contrary to a superlatively developed
personality, which might better be called super-personality. To state
the position here advocated in a nutshell, it is maintained that the
asserted "impersonality" of the Japanese is the result of the
communalistic nature of the social order which has prevailed down to
the most recent times; it has put its stamp on every feature of the
national and individual life, not omitting the language, the
philosophy, the religion, or even the inmost thoughts of the people.
This dominance of the communalistic type of social order has doubtless
had an effect on the physical and psychic, including the brain,
development of the people. These physical and psychical developments,
however, are not the cause, but the product, of the social order. They
are, furthermore, of no superlative import, since they offer no
insuperable obstacle to the introduction of a social order radically
different from that of past millenniums.

Before proceeding to elaborate and illustrate this general position,
it seems desirable to introduce two furt