self, on the one hand, nor to its emphasis on the universal
unity subsisting between the separate finite self and the infinite
soul, on the other; but only on its failure to see the infinite worth
of the individual; and in consequence of this failure, its inability
to modify the general social order by the introduction of
individualism.
The asserted "impersonal" characteristic of Buddhism and of the
Orient, therefore, I am not willing to call "impersonality"; for it is
a very defective description, a real misnomer. I think no single term
can truly describe the characteristic under consideration. As regards
the general social order, the so-called impersonal characteristic is
its communal nature; as regards the popular religious thought, whether
of Shintoism or Buddhism, its so-called impersonality is its simple,
artless objectivity; as regards philosophic Buddhism its so-called
impersonality is its morbid introspective self-consciousness, leading
to the desire and effort to annihilate the separateness of the self.
These are different characteristics and cannot be described by any
single term. So far as there are in Japan genuine altruism, real
suppression of selfish desires, and real possession of kindly feelings
for others and desires to help them, and so far as these qualities
arise through a sense of the essential unity of the human race and of
the unity of the human with the divine soul, this is not
"impersonality"--but a form of highly developed personality--not
infra-personality, but true personality.
We have noted that although esoteric Buddhism developed a highly
accentuated consciousness of self, it attributed no value to that
self. This failure will not appear strange if we consider the
historical reasons for it. Indeed, the failure was inevitable. Neither
the social order nor the method of introspective thought suggested it.
Both served, on the contrary, absolutely to preclude the idea.
When introspective thought began in India the social order was already
far beyond the undifferentiated communal life of the tribal stage.
Castes were universal and fixed. The warp and woof of daily life and
of thought were filled with the distinctions of castes and ranks.
Man's worth was conceived to be not in himself, but in his rank or
caste. The actual life of the people, therefore, did not furnish to
speculative thought the slightest suggestion of the worth of man as
man. It was a positive hindrance to the rise of suc
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