h an idea.

Equally opposed to the rise of this idea was the method of that
introspective thought which discovered the fact of the self. It was a
method of abstraction; it denied as part of the real self everything
that could be thought of as separate; every changing phase or
expression of the self could not be the real self, it was argued,
because, if a part of the real self, how could it sometimes be and
again not be? Feeling cannot be a part of the real self, for sometimes
I feel and sometimes I do not. Any particular desire cannot be a part
of my real self, for sometimes I have it and sometimes I do not. A
similar argument was applied to every objective thing. In the famous
"Questions of King Melinda," the argument as to the real chariot is
expanded at length; the wheels are not the chariot; the spokes are not
the chariot; the seat is not the chariot; the tongue is not the
chariot; the axle is not the chariot; and so, taking up each
individual part of the chariot, the assertion is made that it is not
the chariot. But if the chariot is not in any of its parts, then they
are not essential parts of the chariot. So of the soul--the self; it
does not consist of its various qualities or attributes or powers;
hence they are not essential elements of the self. The real self
exists apart from them.

Now is it not evident that such a method of introspection deprives the
conception of self of all possible value? It is nothing but a bare
intellectual abstraction. To say that this self is a part of the
universal self is no relief,--brings no possible worth to the separate
self,--for the conception of the universal soul has been arrived at by
a similar process of thought. It, too, is nothing but a bare
abstraction, deprived of all qualities and attributes and powers. I
can see no distinction between the absolute universal soul of
Brahmanism and Buddhism, and the Absolute Nothing of Hegel.[CX]

Both are the farthest possible abstraction that the mind can make. The
Absolute Soul of Buddhism, the Atman of Brahmanism, and Hegel's
Nothing are the farthest possible remove from the Christian's
conception of God. The former is the utter emptiness of being; the
latter the perfect fullness of being and completeness of quality. The
finite emptiness receives and can receive no richness of life or
increase in value by its consciousness of unity with the infinite
emptiness; whereas the finite limited soul receives in the Christian
view an