ding to which noble
souls might appear and reappear in different worlds and different
lands, Buddhism could identify Shinto deities with its own deities of
Hindu origin, asserting their pre-incarnation. Having accepted the
Shinto deities, ideals, and sanctions for the social order, Buddhism
became not only tolerable to the people, but also exceedingly popular.

The Shinto-Buddhistic was in truth a new religion, each of the old
religions supplying an essential element.

One real reason, beside its accommodation to Shintoism, why Buddhism
was so popular was that it brought an indispensable element into the
national life. For the first time emphasis began to be laid on the
individual. Introspection and deliberate meditation were brought into
play. Arts demanding individual skill were fostered. A gorgeous
ritual, elaborate architecture, complex religious organism, letters
and literature, all gave play to individual activity and development
whether in manual, in mental, or in aesthetic lines. The hitherto
cramped and primitive life of the Japanese responded to these appeals
and opportunities with profound joy. The upper classes especially felt
themselves growing in richness and fullness of life. They felt the
stimulus in many directions. The reason, then, why Buddhism flourished
so mightily, and at the same time caused the nation to bloom, was
because it helped develop the individual. The reason, on the other
hand, why it failed to carry the nation on from its first bloom into
full fruitage was because it failed to develop individualism in the
social order. Its religious individualism was, as we have seen, in
reality defective. It was abstract and one-sided. It did not discover
the whole of the individual. It did not know anything of personality,
either human or divine. It accordingly could not recognize the
individual's worth, but only his separateness and his weakness. It
taught an abstract impoverished idea of self, and made, as the whole
aim of the salvation it offered, the final annihilation of all
separateness of this individual self. We can now see that its
individualism was essentially defective in that it poured contempt on
the self, and that if its individualizing salvation were consistently
carried out, it was not only no help to the social order, but a
positive injury to it. Its individualism was of a nature which could
not become an integral part of any social order.

This character led to another inevitable