erning
the other. The German genius for organization had proved itself
especially valuable and fertile in this direction. On the basis of this
knowledge, well-defined plans of campaign had been worked out, and the
leaders of both sides had many opportunities to exercise their strategic
abilities, not only by solving problems created by these plans
theoretically across the tables in their respective war colleges, but
also practically during the annual periods of maneuvers.

As the armies faced each other in the first week of August, 1914, the
strategy of both sides was determined chiefly by three factors: (1) by
the obstacles and defenses which nature itself had placed in the
localities in which the fighting was likely to take place; (2) by the
means of defense and offense which were available; (3) by political
conditions.

At the beginning of the war all but the last were absolutely known
quantities, and as far as Russia and Germany were concerned this last
factor could be figured out comparatively easily. For it was clear that
if Germany would become involved in a war with Russia, Austria would be
found fighting by its ally's side and _vice versa_. It was also fairly
reasonable to assume, and had immediately become a fact, that under such
conditions Germany would find itself involved with France too, which
would mean that Germany's available fighting strength would have to be
divided into two parts at least. It was, of course, a matter of fairly
common knowledge that Germany's concentration was much more powerful on
its western border than on its eastern, so that Russia could count with
reasonable certainty on a comparative weak, even if well organized,
resistance on the part of Germany at the beginning of war.

Germany's strategy in the east was influenced chiefly by its plan for
the western campaign, which we have already considered in the preceding
chapters. The fight against France seemed to be of greater importance
and urgency to Germany than that against Russia. Why German strategy
reached this conclusion does not concern us here. In passing, however,
it may be well to remember that the German provinces adjoining France
directly, or indirectly behind Belgium and Luxemburg, were of much
greater importance and value to the Germans than their provinces
adjoining Russia, and that even the temporary loss of these would
probably have spelled disaster to Germany. Then, too, it was on the
western side that England's i