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nfluence was being felt; and, furthermore, the French army, though much less numerous than the Russian, was a more formidable adversary on account of its greater effectiveness, as well as of the certainty of its much quicker movements. Russia had a preponderantly large advantage in numbers over Germany. The result of this fact, from a strategic point of view, was that Russia could dare much more than her adversaries. She could strike stronger, quicker, and with greater frequency in more directions, and could risk to extend her operations much farther. The fact that means of transportation, as has been pointed out, were much better developed in the German frontier provinces than in those of Russia, was a disadvantage only as long as Russia fought on its own territory, though even then, necessarily, the invading enemy would be hampered at least equally by the lack of transportation facilities. Russia's natural advantage of greater numbers pointed clearly to an immediate offensive which would bring with it the promise of more advantages, while both German and Austrian conditions indicated with equal clearness as the safest and sanest strategy a policy of "watchful waiting," at least until such time when large enough forces could be spared from the western front or concentrated from available reserve sources to promise to a more aggressive policy a fair chance of success. Thus Russia decided to strike immediately against Germany as well as against Austria. With the latter campaign we are not concerned here. How she devoted herself to this twofold task with all the power and means at her command we shall see in the following narrative. The hosts of Russia were standing on the German frontier. In the four provinces adjoining Austria-Hungary a total of sixteen army corps, or one-half of all the Russian army in European Russia, were available. By July 31, 1914, the czar had ordered the general mobilization of army and navy. The German Ambassador in Petrograd was instructed to notify the Russian Government that unless this order was countermanded within twelve hours, Germany would immediately respond by mobilization of her army and navy. As the Russian mobilization had continued, Germany officially took the same step in the late afternoon of August 1, 1914, after a state of war had already been proclaimed for the entire empire on July 31, 1914. The fighting forces on the German side at the beginning of the war on or ne
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