of his company of 250,
only 85 were left--the other 66 per cent having been killed or wounded.

Just as the Russians had succeeded in assembling sufficient
reenforcements at Warsaw, to make it inevitable for the German forces to
retreat, they had brought equally large numbers to the rescue of
Ivangorod. However, these did not make themselves really felt there
until October 27, 1914. Previous to that date the Germans and Austrians
captured over 50,000 Russians and thirty-five guns. When, on October 23
and 24, 1904, aeroplane scouts discovered the approaching vast
reenforcements, and similar reports were received from the First Army
fighting around Warsaw, the German and Austrian forces were all
withdrawn. The retreat of these groups of armies was accomplished much
in the same way as of that in the north, except that it began later and
brought with it more frequent and more desperate rear-guard actions. The
Russians, who were trying desperately to inflict as much damage as
possible to the retreating enemy, showed wonderful courage and heroic
disregard of death. In some places, however, the Germans had prepared
strong, even if temporary, intrenchments, sometimes three or more lines
deep, and the storming of these cost their opponents dearly.

By October 24, 1914, the invaders had been forced back in the south as
far as Radom and in the north to Skierniewice; by October 28 Radom as
well as Lodz had been evacuated and were again in Russian hands. The
lines of retreat were the same as those of advance had been, namely, the
railroads from Warsaw to Thorn, Kalish, and Cracow. Much damage was done
to these roads by the Germans in order to delay as much as possible the
pursuit of the Russians. Considerable fighting occurred, however,
whenever one of the rivers along the line of retreat was reached; so
along the Pilitza, the Rawka, the Bzura, and finally the Warta. By the
end of the first week of November the German-Austrian armies had been
thrown back across their frontiers, and all of Russian Poland was once
more in the undisputed possession of Russia.

In a measure Von Hindenburg followed the example of his Russian
adversaries when he withdrew his forces from Poland into Upper Silesia
in November, 1914, after the unsuccessful first drive against Warsaw, of
which we have just read the details. His reasons for taking this step
were evident enough. When it had been established definitely that the
reenforcements which Russia had