robably the Turkish war strength
was underestimated. The chief difficulty was not in finding the men,
but in providing quickly equipment, and at the outset that was evidently
a very real obstacle in Turkey.

The Turkish army was essentially a German creation, and largely the
personal accomplishment of that very able military organizer and student
of war, Field Marshal von der Goltz. Von der Goltz spent a decade with
the Turkish army, and returned to Germany only to reorganize the eastern
defenses of his country in preparation for the Great War. When Turkey
entered the struggle he returned to Constantinople at Enver Bey's
personal request.

The Turk does not become subject to military duty until he reaches the
age of twenty. Then, however, for the next two decades he belongs to the
army, either actually or potentially. The first nine years are spent in
the Nizam or first line, first with the colors and then in immediate
reserve. Then come nine years in the Redif or Landwehr, and, finally,
two years in the Mustaph'-phiz or Landsturm.

All branches of the Turkish army were not equally good. Cavalry and
infantry were probably the equal of corresponding troops in the armies
of any other country, but the inefficiency of the artillery was blamed
for the debacle of the Balkan War. Many of the thousands of German
troops poured into Turkey before and after she entered the war were
trained gunners sent with the object of stiffening the weakest arm of
the Turkish army.

The Turkish army has always suffered, as have the armies of many other
countries, from a shortage of properly trained officers. Since the
advent of the Young Turks, and especially since Enver Pasha, with his
German training, succeeded to the position of Minister of War and
Commander in Chief, the personnel of the officers' corps has been vastly
improved. But it takes years--yes, generations--to create an adequate
supply of officers and noncommissioned officers for an army of the
proportions of Turkey's, and the assistance of the German stiffening
must have been of inestimable advantage to the Ottoman command.

At the outbreak of the war the Turkish army was disposed in four
regional groups. The number of men actually with the colors, according
to the best estimates, was 500,000, with another 250,000 trained men in
immediate reserve awaiting equipment. In or near Constantinople were
about 200,000 troops, including the First, Third, and Fifth Corps, a
part of th