in the results so far as they affected Russia and
Germany at the beginning of the war.

When the armies gathered on the Russo-German frontier, both of these
countries had reached a high degree of military efficiency. Germany,
which for decades had been the acknowledged leader among the great
powers as far as army development was concerned, had practically
concluded the increases and improvements for the accomplishment of which
its people had only recently submitted to a special scheme of very
extensive taxation, the "Wehrbeitrag." By the results of this move, we
find that the western defenses against France and indirectly against
England profited much more than those in the east against Russia.

Russia, as its army stood ready to strike its first blow at Germany, had
drawn to the fullest extent the obvious conclusions impressed upon it by
its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Graft, which had played such great
havoc during its last war, had been stamped out. The artillery equipment
had been brought up to date and the troops in charge of it had increased
vastly their skill in its use. Everywhere formations had been
rearranged, increased and improved, and this rearrangement had affected
especially the distribution of the empire's forces. Never before in its
history had Russia concentrated so many troops in its eastern and
central provinces.

In setting its armies into action, Germany faced by far the easier
problem. Its territory was much more compact, its means of communication
were vastly greater and superior, and racial differences between its
various parts were practically nonexistent. With a total area of 208,825
square miles, the German Empire possessed 39,532 miles of railroad,
whereas the Russian Empire in Europe, with 2,100,000 square miles had
only 35,447 miles of railroad. The Germans had the further advantage of
having brought all their means of transportation to the very acme of
perfection, while the Russians were lacking in equipment as well as in
organization.

The remarkable quickness and effectiveness with which the Russian army
operated at the moment of war indicates not only an unexpectedly high
state of preparedness, but also a remarkably high degree of leadership
on the part of its generals.

The general staffs of both Russia and Germany were as well prepared to
meet on the battle ground as far as it had been within human power and
foresight. Each side had collected all available information conc