ng several times over what is
written; by often contrasting the conduct of the adversary with what
is written; and sometimes by recurring vehemently to the topic of the
judge himself; in which one will remind the judge of what oath he has
taken, of what his conduct is bound to be; and urge that there are two
causes on account of which a judge is bound to hesitate, one if the
law be obscurely worded, the other if the adversary denies anything.
But as in this instance the wording of the law is plain, and the
adversary admits every fact that is alleged, the judge has now nothing
to do but to fulfil the law, and not to interpret it.
XLIV. When this point has been sufficiently insisted on, then it will
be advisable to do away with the effect of those things which the
adversary has been able to urge by way of objection. But such
objections will be made if the framer of the law can be absolutely
proved to have meant one thing, and written another; as in that
dispute concerning the will which we mentioned just now: or some
adventitious cause may be alleged why it was not possible or not
desirable to obey the written law minutely. If it is stated that the
framer of the law meant one thing, and wrote another, then he who
appeals to the letter of the law will say that it is our business not
to discuss the intention of a man who has left us a plain proof of
that intention, to prevent our having any doubt about it; and that
many inconveniences must ensue if the principle is laid down that we
may depart from the letter of the law. For that then those who frame
laws will not think that the laws which they are making will remain
firm; and those who are judges will have no certain principle to
follow if once they get into the habit of departing from the letter of
the law. But if the intention of the framer of the law is what is to
be looked at, then it is he, and not his adversaries, who relies on
the meaning of the lawgiver. For that that person comes much nearer to
the intention of the framer of a law who interprets it from his own
writings, than he who does not look at the meaning of the framer of
the law by that writing of his own which he has left to be as it were
an image of his meaning, but who investigates it under the guidance of
some private suspicions of his own.
If the party who stands on the meaning of the lawgiver brings forward
any reasons, then, in the first place, it will be necessary to reply
to those reasons; to u
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