rge how absurd it is for a man not to deny that
he has acted contrary to the law, but at the same time to give some
reason for having acted so. Then one will say too that all things are
turned upside down; that formerly prosecutors were in the habit of
trying to persuade the judges that the person who was being prosecuted
before them was implicated in some fault, and of alleging some reasons
which had instigated him to commit this fault; but that now the
accused person himself is giving the reasons why he has offended
against the laws. Then it will be proper to introduce this division,
each portion of which will have many lines of argument suitable to it:
in the first place, that there is no law with reference to which it
is allowable to allege any reasons contrary to the law; in the next
place, that if such a course is admissible in any law, this is such a
law that it is not admissible with respect to it; and lastly, that,
even if such reasons ever might be alleged, at all events this is not
such a reason.
XLV. The first part of the argument is confirmed by pretty nearly the
same topics as these: that the framer of the law was not deficient in
either ability, or pains, or any faculty requisite to enable him to
express plainly what his intention was; that it would not have been
either displeasing or difficult to him to insert such an exception as
that which the opposite party contends for in his law, if he thought
any exception requisite; and in fact, that those people who frame
laws often do insert clauses of exceptions. After that it is well to
enumerate some of the laws which have exceptional clauses attached to
them, and to take especial care to see whether in the law itself which
is under discussion there is any exception made in any chapter, or
whether the same man who framed this law has made exceptions in other
laws, so that it may be more naturally inferred that he would have
made exceptions in this one, if he had thought exceptions requisite;
and it will be well also to show that to admit of a reason for
violating the law is the same thing as abrogating the law, because
when once such a reason is taken into consideration it is no use to
consider it with reference to the law, inasmuch as it is not stated in
the law. And if such a principle is once laid down, then a reason for
violating the law, and a licence to do so, is given to every one, as
soon as they perceive that you as judges decide the matter in a way
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