chastising guilt and wickedness; that the very framer of the
laws, if he were alive, would approve of this conduct, and would
have done the very same thing himself if he had been in similar
circumstances. And that it is on this account that the framer of the
law appointed judges of a certain rank and age, in order that there
might be men, not capable merely of reading out what he had written,
which any boy might do, but able also to understand his thoughts and
to interpret his intentions. He will add, that that framer of the law,
if he had been intrusting the laws which he was drawing up to foolish
men and illiterate judges, would have set down everything with the
most scrupulous diligence; but, as it is, because he was aware what
sort of men were to be the judges, he did not put down many things
which appeared to him to be evident; and he expected that you would be
not mere readers of his writings, but interpreters of his intentions.
Afterwards he will proceed to ask his adversaries--"What would you
say if I had done so and so?" "What would you think if so and so had
happened?" "Suppose any one of those things had happened which would
have had a most unfailing excuse, or a most undeniable necessity,
would you then have prosecuted me?" But the law has nowhere made any
such exception. It follows, therefore, that it is not every possible
circumstance which is mentioned in the written law but that some
things which are self-evident are guarded against by unexpressed
exceptions. Then he will urge, that nothing could be carried on
properly either by the laws or by any written document whatever, or
even in daily conversation, or in the commands given in a private
household, if every one chose to keep his eyes on the exact language
of the order, and not to take into consideration the intentions of him
who uttered the order.
XLVIII. After that he will be able, by reference to the divisions
of usefulness and honour, to point out how inexpedient or how
dishonourable that would have been which the opposite party say ought
to have been done, or to be done now. And on the other hand, how
expedient and how honourable that is which we have done, or demand
should be done. In the next place, he will urge that we set a value on
our laws not on account of their wording, which is a slight and
often obscure indication of their intention, but on account of the
usefulness of those things concerning which they are written, and the
wisdom an
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