ominates.
Without attributing to Germany any wrong purpose or any design of
injustice it must be evident that her very great strength must give her
in case of dispute, always possible between independent States, a
corresponding advantage against any other Power whose views or whose
intentions should not coincide with hers. It is the obvious possibility
of such dispute that makes it incumbent upon Great Britain to prepare
herself in case of disagreement to enter into a discussion with Germany
upon equal terms.
Only upon such preparation can Great Britain base the hope either of
averting a quarrel with Germany, or in case a quarrel should arise and
cannot be made up by mutual agreement, of settling it by the arbitrament
of war upon terms accordant with the British conception of right. Great
Britain therefore must give herself a national organisation for war and
must make preparation for war the nation's first business until a
reasonable security has been attained.
The question is, what weapons are now available for Great Britain in
case of a disagreement with Germany leading to conflict? In the old
wars, as we have seen, she had three modes of action. She used her navy
to obtain control of the sea-ways, and then she used that control partly
to destroy the sea-borne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies
across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. By the combination of
these three modes of operation she was strong enough to give valuable
help to other Powers, and therefore she had allies whose assistance was
as useful to her as hers to them. To-day, as we have seen, the same
conditions no longer exist. The British navy may indeed hope to obtain
control of the sea-ways, but the law of maritime war, as it has been
settled by the Declarations of Paris and of London, makes it
impracticable for Great Britain to use a naval victory, even if she wins
it, in such a way as to be able commercially to throttle a hostile
Power, while the British military forces available for employment on the
Continent are so small as hardly to count in the balance. The result is
that Great Britain's power of action against a possible enemy is greatly
reduced, partly in consequence of changes in the laws of war, but
perhaps still more in consequence of the fact that while other Powers
are organised for war as nations, England in regard to war is still in
the condition of the eighteenth century, relying upon a small standing
army, a pu
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