to that maintained by Italy,
which though the fifth Power on the Continent is most nearly her equal
in territory and population, the equilibrium could be restored, and
either the peace of Europe would be maintained, or in case of fresh
conflict there would be a reasonable prospect of the recurrence of what
has happened in the past, the maintenance, against a threatened
domination, of the independence of the European States.
The position here set forth is grave enough to demand the close
attention of the British nation, for it means that England might at any
time be called upon to enter into a contest, likely enough to take the
form of a struggle for existence, against the greatest military empire
in the world, supported by another military empire which is itself in
the front rank of great Powers, while the other European States would be
looking on comparatively helpless.
But this is by no means a full statement of the case. The other Powers
might not find it possible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. It is
much more probable that they would have to choose between one side and
the other; and that if they do not consider Great Britain strong enough
to help them they may find it their interest, and indeed may be
compelled, to take the side of Great Britain's adversaries. In that case
Great Britain would have to carry on a struggle for existence against
the combined forces of the Continent.
That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for one
am unwilling to admit. If Great Britain were organised for war and able
to throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that her
overthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregone
conclusion. But the determined preparation which would make her ready
for the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means of
preventing its occurrence.
XI.
POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT
I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict Great
Britain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in a
position of some peril. She has not created for herself the means of
making good by force a cause with which she may be identified but which
may be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she would
have allies. There remains the second question whether, in the absence
of might, she would at least have right on her side. That depends upon
the nature of the quarrel. A good cause ought to unite her
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