------------
_Materiel_, allowing for additional cost due
to larger numbers . . . . 4,500,000
Staff and administration . . . 1,500,000
------------
Total cost of army at home and in the
Colonies . . . . . L27,394,464
============
The figures here given will, it is hoped, speak for themselves. They
are, if anything, too high rather than too low. The number of officers
is calculated on the basis of the present war establishments, which give
5625 officers for 160,500 of the other ranks. It does not include those
in Egypt and the Colonies. The cost of the officers is taken at a higher
average rate than that of British officers of the combatant arms under
the present system, and, both for sergeants and for privates, ample
allowance appears to me to be made even on the basis of their present
cost.
When it is considered that Germany maintains with the colours a force of
600,000 men at a cost of L29,000,000, that France maintains 550,000 for
L27,000,000, and that Italy maintains 221,000 for L7,500,000, it cannot
be admitted that Great Britain would be unable to maintain 220,000
officers and men at an annual cost of L17,500,000, and the probability
is that with effective administration this cost could be considerably
reduced.
It may at first sight seem that the logical course would have been to
assume two years' service in the infantry and three years' service in
the mounted arms, in accord with the German practice, but there are
several reasons that appear to me to make such a proposal unnecessary.
In the first place, Great Britain's principal weapon must always be her
navy, while Germany's principal weapon will always be her army, which
guarantees the integrity of her three frontiers and also guards her
against invasion from oversea. Germany's navy comes only in the second
place in any scheme for a German war, while in any scheme for a British
war the navy must come in the first place and the army in the second.
The German practice for many years was to retain the bulk of the men for
three years with the colours. It was believed by the older generation of
soldiers that any reduction of this period would compromise that
cohesion of the troops which is the characteristic mark of a
disciplined army. But the views of the younger men pr
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