to have the same good
fortune as the Romans. For the mass of the people will consider that
they have to thank not him, but his enemies, and that there is ground
to fear that when the danger has passed away, he will take back what he
gave under compulsion, and, therefore, that to him they lie under
no obligation. And the reason why the course followed by the Romans
succeeded, was that the State was still new and unsettled. Besides
which, the people knew that laws had already been passed in their
favour, as, for instance, the law allowing an appeal to the tribunes,
and could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted them
proceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate, and
were not due merely to the approach of an enemy. Moreover, the memory of
their kings, by whom they had in many ways been wronged and ill-treated,
was still fresh in their minds. But since like conditions seldom recur,
it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful. Wherefore, all,
whether princes or republics, who hold the reins of government, ought to
think beforehand of the adverse times which may await them, and of what
help they may then stand in need; and ought so to live with their people
as they would think right were they suffering under any calamity. And,
whosoever, whether prince or republic, but prince more especially,
behaves otherwise, and believes that after the event and when danger is
upon him he will be able to win men over by benefits, deceives
himself, and will not merely fail to maintain his place, but will even
precipitate his downfall.

CHAPTER XXXIII.--_When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State,
it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence_.

As Rome grew in fame, power, and dominion, her neighbours, who at first
had taken no heed to the injury which this new republic might do them,
began too late to see their mistake, and desiring to remedy what should
have been remedied before, combined against her to the number of forty
nations. Whereupon the Romans, resorting to a method usual with them in
seasons of peril, appointed a dictator; that is, gave power to one man
to decide without advice, and carry out his resolves without appeal.
Which expedient, as it then enabled them to overcome the dangers
by which they were threatened, so always afterwards proved most
serviceable, when, at any time during the growth of their power,
difficulties arose to embarrass their