they are alike, though in some they differ. Of one thing, however,
I am convinced, namely, that engagements made under duress will never be
observed either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if menaced with
the loss of their territories, both the one and the other will break
faith with you and treat you with ingratitude. Demetrius, who was named
the "City-taker," had conferred numberless benefits upon the Athenians;
but when, afterwards, on being defeated by his enemies, he sought
shelter in Athens, as being a friendly city and under obligations to
him, it was refused him; a circumstance which grieved him far more than
the loss of his soldiers and army had done. Pompey, in like manner, when
routed by Caesar in Thessaly, fled for refuge to Ptolemy in Egypt, who
formerly had been restored by him to his kingdom; by whom he was put to
death. In both these instances the same causes were at work, although
the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less in the case of the
commonwealth than of the prince. Still, wherever there is fear, the want
of faith will be the same.

And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to
keep faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a like
cause. For, as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is friend to
a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without means to
defend him, he may presently hope to see restored to his dominions; or
it may be that having linked his fortunes with another's, he despairs of
finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of his ally, as was
the case with those Neapolitan princes who espoused the interests of
France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar to that of the princes
last named, is that of Saguntum in Spain, which awaited ruin in adhering
to the fortunes of Rome. A like course was also followed by Florence
when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly by the cause of the
French. And taking everything into account, I believe that in cases
of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of stability sooner in
commonwealths than in princes. For though commonwealths be like-minded
with princes, and influenced by the same passions, the circumstance that
their movements must be slower, makes it harder for them to resolve than
it is for a prince, for which reason they will be less ready to break
faith.

And since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain
advantages, in this respect al