ory and
empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in view, it
became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship.

A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the
Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the
citizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance.
But the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For
Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the
friends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in
order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of
engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of
picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when they
are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I desire
to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and binding
treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the friend of
that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend, either the
prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in war will be
realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or baseness in
not defending one who is under his protection will be made apparent;
either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further my designs.

We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the
Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power to
war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its
own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,--that
remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects
for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans,
and as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples, who,
after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of Lucca
by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects.

CHAPTER X.--_That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the
Sinews of War_.

Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his
pleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike
enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself accordingly.
But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to his strength,
which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by advantage of
position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is