eful First,
because, as has been said already, they render a ruler bolder and more
violent in his bearing towards his subjects, and, next, because they do
not in reality afford him that security which he believes them to give
For all those methods of violence and coercion which may be used to
keep a people under, resolve themselves into two; since either like the
Romans you must always have it in your power to bring a strong army into
the field, or else you must dissipate, destroy, and disunite the subject
people, and so divide and scatter them that they can never again
combine to injure you For should you merely strip them of their wealth,
_spoliatis arma supersunt_, arms still remain to them, or if you deprive
them of their weapons, _furor arma ministrat_, rage will supply them, if
you put their chiefs to death and continue to maltreat the rest, heads
will renew themselves like those Hydra; while, if you build fortresses,
these may serve in time of peace to make you bolder in outraging your
subjects, but in time of war they will prove wholly useless, since
they will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic, whom
together it will be impossible for you to resist. And if ever fortresses
were useless they are so at the present day, by reason of the invention
of artillery, against the fury of which, as I have shown already, a
petty fortress which affords no room for retreat behind fresh works,
cannot be defended.

But to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you are a prince seeking
by means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in check;
or you are a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to control some
city which you have gained in war. To the prince I would say, that, for
the reasons already given, nothing can be more unserviceable than a
fortress as a restraint upon your subjects, since it only makes you the
readier to oppress them, and less scrupulous how you do so; while it is
this very oppression which moves them to destroy you, and so kindles
their hatred, that the fortress, which is the cause of all the mischief,
is powerless to protect you. A wise and good prince, therefore, that
he may continue good, and give no occasion or encouragement to his
descendants to become evil, will never build a fortress, to the end that
neither he nor they may ever be led to trust to it rather than to the
good-will of their subjects. And if Francesco Sforza, who was accounted
a wise ruler, on becomi