ce of excessive indulgence as
of excessive injury; as when Perennius conspired against Commodus,
Plautianus against Severus, and Sejanus against Tiberius; all of whom
had been raised by their masters to such wealth, honours, and dignities,
that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the imperial name.
That they might not lack this also, they fell to conspiring against
their prince; but in every instance their conspiracies had the end which
their ingratitude deserved.

The only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the
conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d'Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, lord
of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero, and
loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his State. Similar to this,
in our own days, was the conspiracy of Coppola against King Ferdinand of
Aragon. For Coppola had reached such a pitch of power that he seemed to
himself to have everything but sovereignty; in seeking to obtain which
he lost his life; though if any plot entered into by a man of great
position could be expected to succeed, this certainly might, being
contrived, as we may say, by another king, and by one who had the
amplest opportunities for its accomplishment. But that lust of power
which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the
execution of the scheme was committed; who, had they only known how to
add prudence to their villainy, could hardly have missed their aim.

The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought more
to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to whom
he has done great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities which the
former have in abundance; and the moving cause is equally strong in
both, lust of power being at least as strong a passion as lust of
revenge. Wherefore, a prince should entrust his friends with so much
authority only as leaves a certain interval between his position and
theirs; that between the two something be still left them to desire.
Otherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes who
have been named above.

But to return from this digression, I say, that having shown it to be
necessary that conspirators should be men of great station, and such as
have ready access to the prince, we have next to consider what have been
the results of their plots, and to trace the causes which have made them
succeed or fail. Now, as I have said already, we find that conspi