e or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is directed, that
on getting word of it, and before taking any steps to punish it, they
endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its character, and after
carefully weighing the strength of the conspirators with their own, on
finding it preponderate, never suffer their knowledge of the plot to
appear until they are ready with a force sufficient to crush it. For
otherwise, to disclose their knowledge will only give the signal for
their destruction. They must strive therefore to seem unconscious of
what is going on; for conspirators who see themselves detected are
driven forward by necessity and will stick at nothing. Of this
precaution we have an example in Roman history, when the officers of the
two legions, who, as has already been mentioned, were left behind to
defend the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired together against the
Capuans. For on rumours of this conspiracy reaching Rome, Rutilius the
new consul was charged to see to it; who, not to excite the suspicions
of the conspirators, publicly gave out that by order of the senate
the Capuan legions were continued in their station. The conspirators
believing this, and thinking they would have ample time to execute their
plans, made no effort to hasten matters, but remained at their ease,
until they found that the consul was moving one of the two legions to
a distance from the other. This arousing their suspicion, led them to
disclose their designs and endeavour to carry them out.

Now, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever way
we look at it. For it shows how slow men are to move in those matters
wherein time seems of little importance, and how active they become when
necessity urges them. Nor can a prince or commonwealth desiring for
their own ends to retard the execution of a conspiracy, use any
more effectual means to do so, than by artfully holding out to the
conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon to present itself;
awaiting which, and believing they have time and to spare for what they
have to do, they will afford that prince or commonwealth all the leisure
needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever neglects these
precautions hastens his own destruction, as happened with the Duke of
Athens, and with Guglielmo de' Pazzi. For the Duke, who had made himself
tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being conspired against,
without further inquiry into the matter, caused o