elf on the summit of a hill, where he intrenched
himself strongly, thinking that the Romans would not venture to attack
him there. But they advancing and attacking him in his intrenchments,
drove him from his position; when, unable to make further resistance, he
fled with the greater part of his army, and was only saved from utter
destruction by the difficulty of the ground, which made it impossible
for the Romans to pursue him.

Philip, therefore, who had no mind to fight, encamping too near the
Romans, was forced to fly; and learning from this experience that to
escape fighting it was not enough for him to intrench himself on a hill,
yet not choosing to shut himself up in a walled town, he was constrained
to take the other alternative of keeping at a distance of many miles
from the Roman legions. Accordingly, when the Romans entered one
province, he betook himself to another, and when they left a province he
entered it. But perceiving that by protracting the war in this way, his
condition grew constantly worse, while his subjects suffered grievously,
now from his own troops, at another time from those of the enemy, he at
last resolved to hazard battle, and so came to a regular engagement with
the Romans.

It is for your interest, therefore, not to fight, when you possess the
same advantages as Fabius, or as Cneius Sulpitius had; in other words,
when your army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare not attack
you in your intrenchments, and although he has got within your territory
has yet gained no footing there, and suffers in consequence from the
want of necessary supplies. In such circumstances delay is useful, for
the reasons assigned by Titus Livius when speaking of Sulpitius. In
no other circumstances, however, can an engagement be avoided without
dishonour or danger. For to retire as Philip did, is nothing else than
defeat; and the disgrace is greater in proportion as your valour has
been less put to the proof. And if Philip was lucky enough to escape,
another, not similarly favoured by the nature of the ground, might not
have the same good fortune.

That Hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare there is none
will venture to maintain. Wherefore, when he had to encounter Scipio in
Africa, it may be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging
the war he would have done so; and, possibly, being a skilful captain
and in command of a valiant army, he might have been able to do what
Fabius