whole responsibility attending it rests with them. For
as men judge of things by their results, any evil which ensues from such
measures will be imputed to their author. And although if good ensue he
will be applauded, nevertheless in matters of this kind, what a man may
gain is as nothing to what he may lose.

Selim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is called, being in
readiness, as some who come from his country relate, to set forth on an
expedition against Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws whom
he had stationed on the confines of Persia, to make war upon the Sofi.
In compliance with which advice he went on this new enterprise with a
vast army. But coming to a great plain, wherein were many deserts and
few streams, and encountering the same difficulties as in ancient times
had proved the ruin of many Roman armies, he suffered so much from
pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in battle, he lost a
great part of his men. This so enraged him against the bashaw on whose
advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death.

In like manner, we read of many citizens who having strenuously promoted
various measures were banished when these turned out badly. Certain
citizens of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding a law
allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul. This law passing,
it so happened that the first plebeian consul who went forth with the
armies was routed; and had it not been that the party in whose behalf
the law was made was extremely powerful, its promoters would have fared
badly. It is plain therefore that the counsellors whether of a
republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if they do not
conscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their city
or prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise it, they risk
their places and their lives; all men being subject to this infirmity of
judging advice by the event.

When I consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be
escaped, I find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice
you proceed discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner with
the measure you would see carried out, but offering your opinion without
heat, and supporting it temperately and modestly, so that if the prince
or city follow it, they shall do so of their own good-will, and not seem
to be dragged into it by your importunity. When you act thus, neither
prince nor people