o the liberty of
the State must thence have resulted, had not a method been devised by
Appius Claudius for controlling the ambition of the tribunes. This was,
to secure that there should always be one of their number timid, or
venal, or else a lover of the general good, who could be influenced to
oppose the rest whenever these sought to pass any measure contrary to
the wishes of the senate. This remedy was a great restraint on the
excessive authority of the tribunes, and on many occasions proved
serviceable to Rome.
I am led by this circumstance to remark, that when many powerful
persons are united against one, who, although no match for the others
collectively, is also powerful, the chances are more in favour of this
single and less I powerful person, than of the many who together are
much stronger. For setting aside an infinity of accidents which can be
turned to better account by one than by many, it will always happen
that, by exercising a little dexterity, the one will be able to divide
the many, and weaken the force which was strong while it was united. In
proof whereof, I shall not refer to ancient examples, though many such
might be cited, but content myself with certain modern instances taken
from the events of our own times.
In the year 1484, all Italy combined against the Venetians, who finding
their position desperate, and being unable to keep their army any longer
in the field, bribed Signer Lodovico, who then governed Milan, and so
succeeded in effecting a settlement, whereby they not only recovered
the towns they had lost, but also obtained for themselves a part of the
territories of Ferrara; so that those were by peace the gainers, who in
war had been the losers. Not many years ago the whole world was banded
together against France; but before the war came to a close, Spain
breaking with the confederates and entering into a separate treaty with
France, the other members of the league also, were presently forced to
make terms.
Wherefore we may always assume when we see a war set on foot by many
against one, that this one, if he have strength to withstand the first
shock, and can temporize and wait his opportunity, is certain to
prevail. But unless he can do this he runs a thousand dangers: as did
the Venetians in the year 1508, who, could they have temporized with the
French, and so got time to conciliate some of those who had combined
against them, might have escaped the ruin which then overtook th
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