Maximus who wore out Hannibal by
keeping him at bay, I think it opportune to consider in the following
Chapter whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at all risks,
can be prevented by that enemy from doing so.

CHAPTER X.--_That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces
it on him at all risks._

"_Cneius Sulpitius when appointed dictator against the Gauls, being
unwilling to tempt Fortune by attacking an enemy whom delay and a
disadvantageous position would every day render weaker, protracted the
war._"

When a mistake is made of a sort that all or most men are likely to fall
into, I think it not amiss to mark it again and again with disapproval.
Wherefore, although I have already shown repeatedly how in affairs of
moment the actions of the moderns conform not to those of antiquity,
still it seems to me not superfluous, in this place, to say the same
thing once more. For if in any particular the moderns have deviated
from the methods of the ancients, it is especially in their methods of
warfare, wherein not one of those rules formerly so much esteemed is
now attended to. And this because both princes and commonwealths have
devolved the charge of such matters upon others, and, to escape danger,
have kept aloof from all military service; so that although one or
another of the princes of our times may occasionally be seen present
in person with his army, we are not therefore to expect from him any
further praiseworthy behaviour. For even where such personages take part
in any warlike enterprise, they do so out of ostentation and from no
nobler motive; though doubtless from sometimes seeing their soldiers
face to face, and from retaining to themselves the title of command,
they are likely to make fewer blunders than we find made by republics,
and most of all by the republics of Italy, which though altogether
dependent upon others, and themselves utterly ignorant of everything
relating to warfare, do yet, that they may figure as the commanders of
their armies, take upon them to direct their movements, and in doing so
commit countless mistakes; some of which have been considered elsewhere
but one is of such importance as to deserve notice here.

When these sluggard princes or effeminate republics send forth any of
their Captains, it seems to them that the wisest instruction they can
give him is to charge him on no account to give battle, but, on the
contrary, to do what he can to avoid fighting.