itizens of Capua were unworthy to enjoy
advantages which they knew not how to defend. The Romans, however,
getting timely notice of this design, at once met and defeated it,
in the manner to be more fully noticed when I come to treat of
conspiracies.

Once more then, I repeat, that of all the various kinds of troops,
auxiliaries are the most pernicious, because the prince or republic
resorting to them for aid has no authority over them, the only person
who possesses such authority being he who sends them. For, as I have
said, auxiliary troops are those sent to your assistance by some other
potentate, under his own flag, under his own officers, and in his own
pay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua. Such troops, if
victorious, will for the most part plunder him by whom, as well as him
against whom, they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes at
the instigation of the potentate who sends them, sometimes for ambitious
ends of their own. It was not the purpose of the Romans to violate the
league and treaty which they had made with Capua; but to their soldiers
it seemed so easy a matter to master the Capuans, that they were readily
led into this plot for depriving them of their town and territories.
Many other examples might be given to the same effect, but it is enough
to mention besides this instance, that of the people of Regium, who were
deprived of their city and of their lives by another Roman legion sent
for their protection.

Princes and republics, therefore, should resort to any other expedient
for the defence of their States sooner than call in hired auxiliaries,
when they have to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since any
accord or terms, however hard, which you may make with your enemy, will
be carefully studied and current events well considered, it will be seen
that for one who has succeeded with such assistance, hundreds have been
betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any better opportunity for usurping a city
or province present itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth, than
to be asked to send an army for its defence. On the other hand, he who
is so greedy of conquest as to summon such help, not for purposes of
defence but in order to attack others, seeks to have what he can never
hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very person who
helps him to gain it. Yet such is the perversity of men that, to gratify
the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those ills