after much deliberation resolved
to lend them no help while they continued to live under a king;
judging it useless to defend a country given over to servitude by its
inhabitants.
It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among
nations, for we know by experience that States have never signally
increased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they have lived
under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what a
pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she had
freed herself from the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to
contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after freeing herself
from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the
well-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a State
great; and, without question, this universal well-being is nowhere
secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever makes for
its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this man or to
that, there are so many whom they benefit, that these are able to carry
them out, in spite of the resistance of the few whom they injure.
But the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what
helps him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that
whenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least
evil which can befall that city is to make no further progress, nor ever
increase in power or wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it will
be its fate to go back. Or should there chance to arise in it some able
tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms, the
advantage which results is to himself only, and not to the State;
since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he
tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, lest afterwards
he should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which he
acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules; because
to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies in
keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately
recognize him alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his
country, is the gainer by his conquests. And if any one desire to have
this view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him look into
Xenophon's treatise _De Tirannide_.
No wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with such
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