ier's stipend might be paid, they could not
persuade them to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude; which
was further increased by the manner in which the senate distributed the
taxes, imposing on the nobles all the heavier and greater, and those
which had to be paid first.

CHAPTER LII.--_That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing
too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to
objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to
advance himself_.

It has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles
gained with the commons by a show of good-will towards them, not only in
providing for their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation. Had
the senate constantly adhered to methods like these, they would have put
an end to all disturbances in Rome, and have deprived the tribunes
of the credit they had with the people, and of the influence thence
arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and especially in one
which has become corrupted, there is no better, or easier, or less
objectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to
anticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to the
ends he has in view. This plan, had it been followed by the enemies of
Cosimo de' Medici, would have proved a far more useful course for them
than to banish him from Florence; since if those citizens who opposed
him had adopted his methods for gaining over the people, they would have
succeeded, without violence or tumult, in taking his most effective
weapon from his hands.

The influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini was entirely due to
his skill in securing the affections of the people, since in this way he
obtained among them a name for loving the liberties of the commonwealth.
And truly, for those citizens who envied his greatness it would have
been both easier and more honourable, and at the same time far less
dangerous and hurtful to the State, to forestall him in those measures
by which he was growing powerful, than to oppose him in such a manner
that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of the entire republic.
For had they, as they might easily have done, deprived him of the
weapons which made him formidable, they could then have withstood him in
all the councils, and in all public deliberations, without either being
suspected or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the citizens who
hated Piero Soderini committe