f the Roman emperors, and of
other princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and
fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people.

I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that a
people when they have the management of affairs are changeable, fickle,
and ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise than
as they exist in individual princes; so that were any to accuse both
princes and peoples, the charge might be true, but that to make
exception in favour of princes is a mistake; for a people in command,
if it be duly restrained, will have the same prudence and the same
gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he may be
reckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of
the laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a
people. And further, I say that any difference in their methods of
acting results not from any difference in their nature, that being the
same in both, or, if there be advantage on either side, the advantage
resting with the people, but from their having more or less respect for
the laws under which each lives. And whosoever attentively considers the
history of the Roman people, may see that for four hundred years they
never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name, and were constantly
devoted to the glory and welfare of their country, and will find
numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both
particulars. And should any allege against me the ingratitude they
showed to Scipio, I reply by what has already been said at length on
that head, where I proved that peoples are less ungrateful than princes.
But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a people is
more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince. Nor is
it without reason that the voice of the people has been likened to the
voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil themselves,
and bring about marvellous results, so as to have the appearance of
presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe. Again, as to the
justice of their opinions on public affairs, seldom find that after
hearing two speakers of equal ability urging them in opposite
directions, they do not adopt the sounder view, or are unable to decide
on the truth of what they hear. And if, as I have said, a people errs in
adopting courses which appear to it bold and advantageous, princes will
likewise err when their pas