d giving it to be understood that if ever they found
themselves in the Signory, they would expose the designs of these
citizens and have them punished. From time to time it happened that
one or another of those who used this language rose to be of the chief
magistracy, and so soon as he obtained this advancement, and saw things
nearer, became aware whence the disorders I have spoken of really came,
the dangers attending them, and the difficulty in dealing with them; and
recognizing that they were the growth of the times, and not occasioned
by particular men, suddenly altered his views and conduct; a nearer
knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had been
led into on a general view of affairs. But those who had heard him speak
as a private citizen, when they saw him remain inactive after he was
made a magistrate, believed that this arose not from his having obtained
any better knowledge of things, but from his having been cajoled or
corrupted by the great. And this happening with many men and often, it
came to be a proverb among the people, that "_men had one mind in the
market-place, another in the palace._"

Reflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly men's eyes may be
opened, if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities, we can
find a way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did in the case
of the Capuans, and the senate in the case of Rome. Nor do I believe
that any prudent man need shrink from the judgment of the people in
questions relating to particulars, as, for instance, in the distribution
of honours and dignities. For in such matters only, the people are
either never mistaken, or at any rate far seldomer than a small number
of persons would be, were the distribution entrusted to them.

It seems to me, however, not out of place to notice in the following
Chapter, a method employed by the Roman senate to enlighten the people
in making this distribution.

CHAPTER XLVIII.--_He who would not have an Office bestowed on some
worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by
one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the
highest degree noble and good._

Whenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes with consular
powers being chosen exclusively from the commons, it took one or other
of two ways,--either by causing the office to be solicited by the most
distinguished among the citizens; or else, to confess the truth,