ne suivant que ces propres
loix qu'elle a recues avec son etre, elle s'accorde pourtant avec
l'autre tout comme s'il y avoit une influence mutuelle, ou comme
si Dieu y mettoit toujours la main au de-la de son coneours general.
Apres cela je n'ai pas besoin de rien prouver a moins qu'on ne
veuille exiger que je prouve que Dieu est assez habile pout se servir
de cette artifice," &c.--leibnitz Opera, p. 133. Berlin edition,
1840.
Leibnitz, as we have said, attempts to reconcile his system with
Christianity, and therefore, of course, this theory of the relation of
mind and body wears a very different aspect under his treatment
from what it wears under that of Spinoza. But Spinoza and
Leibnitz both agree in this one peculiar conception in which they differ
from all other philosophers before or after them--that mind and
body have no direct communication with each other, and that the
phenomena of them merely correspond. M. de Carell says they
both borrowed it from Descartes; but that is impossible. Descartes
held no such opinion, it was the precise point of disagreement at
which Spinoza parted from him: and therefore, since in point of
date Spinoza had the advantage of Leibnitz, and we know that
Leibnitz was acquainted with his writings, we must either suppose
that he was directly indebted to Spinoza for an obligation which
he ought to have acknowledged, or else, which is extremely
improbable, that having read Spinoza and forgotten him, he afterwards
reoriginated for himself one of the most singular and peculiar
notions which was ever offered to the belief of mankind.
So much for the first point, which, after all, is but of little
moment. It is more important to ascertain whether, in the hands
of Leibnitz, this theory can be any better reconciled with what is
commonly meant by religion; whether, that is, the ideas of
obedience and disobedience, merit and demerit, judgment and retribution,
have any proper place under it. Spinoza makes no pretension to
anything of the kind, and openly declares that these ideas are
ideas merely, and human mistakes. Leibnitz, in opposition to
him, endeavours to re-establish them in the following manner. It
is true he conceives that the system of the universe has been
arranged and predetermined from the moment at which it was
launched into being; from the moment at which God selected it,
with all its details, as the best which could exist; but it is
carried on by the action of individual crea
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