e writes to Spinoza, "that the modification which
constitutes my mind, and that which constitutes my
body, although it be one and the same modification, yet
must be expressed in an infinity of ways; one way by
thought, a second way by extension, a third by some
attribute unknown to me, and so on to infinity; the
attributes being infinite in number, and the order and
connection of modes being the same in them all; why,
then, does the mind perceive the modes of but one
attribute only?"

Spinoza's answer is curious: unhappily a fragment
of his letter only is extant, so that it is too brief to be
satisfactory.

"In reply to your difficulty," he says, "although each
particular thing be truly in the Infinite mind, conceived
in Infinite modes, the Infinite idea answering to all
these cannot constitute one and the same mind of any
single being, but must constitute Infinite minds. No
one of all these Infinite ideas has any connection with
another."

He means, we suppose, that God's mind only perceives,
or can perceive, things under their Infinite expression,
and that the idea of each several mode, under
whatever attribute, constitutes a separate mind.

We do not know that we can add anything to this
explanation; the difficulty lies in the audacious sweep
of the speculation itself; we will however attempt an
illustration, although we fear it will be to illustrate
obscurum tier obscurius. Let A B C D be four out of
the Infinite number of the Divine attributes. A the
attribute of mind; B the attribute of extension; C and
D other attributes, the nature of which is not known
to us. Now A, as the attribute of mind, is that which
perceives all which takes place under B C and D, but it
is only as it exists in God that it forms the universal
consciousness of an attributes at once. In its modifications
it is combined separately with the modifications of
each, constituting in combination with the modes of
each attribute a separate being. As forming the mind
of B, A perceives what takes place in B, but not what
takes place in C or D. Combined with B, it forms the
soul of the human body, and generally the soul of all
modifications of extended substance; combined with C,
it forms the soul of some other analogous being;
combined with D, again of another; but the combinations
are only in pairs, in which A is constant. A and B
make one being, A and C another, A and D a third;
but B will not combine with C, nor C with D; each
attri