s are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it
follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs
observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and
wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

_I answer that,_ This question is partly solved by what was said
above (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with
freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by
heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least,
everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some
of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause;
and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded
that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by
Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered
to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems
not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of
necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is
a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a
cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.
For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is)
"musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has
not a cause, because it is not t