s
one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the
mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote:
"Thy fate draws thee."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 3]

Whether Fate Is Unchangeable?

Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
Providence."

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent
to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore
fate is changeable.

Obj. 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate
seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.

_I answer that,_ The disposition of second causes which we call fate,
can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second
causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to
the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some,
therefore, have held that the series itself o[f] dispositions of
causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of
necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a
cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as
proved above (Q. 115, A. 6).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that
fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the
reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second
causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it
derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of
conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is
true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will
happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is
fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is deriv