ed from an
unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 4]
Whether All Things Are Subject to Fate?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven
and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them
by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born
into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of
offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from
the domain of fate.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
(Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of
second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is
done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,
neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification
of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a
state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence
it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the
more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it
is bound up with second causes.
Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by
God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as
to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as
already stated.
Reply Obj. 3: Although all
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