Obj. 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as
their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and
not in creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or
an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a
disposition inherent to changeable things."

_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 22,
A. 3; Q. 103, A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering
of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering
as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of
certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine
Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by
all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of
the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is
forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. 104,
A. 2; Q. 110, A. 1; Q. 113; Q. 114). It is therefore manifest that
fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the
production of their effects.

Reply Obj. 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine
(De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or
will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second
causes.

Reply Obj. 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the
second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply Obj. 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition
which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be
considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate i