(De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.
_On the contrary,_ What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order."
_I answer that,_ In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or
chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some
higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are
sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two
servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the
master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence (Q. 22, A. 2).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or
in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine , loc. cit., v, 1, 8, 9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. 115, A.
4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate,
since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of
necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place.
Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been
said (Q. 115, A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking
neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates
in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is
accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No
natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that
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