weather beam. The other ships ahead of her were likewise too
much crowded together."

As the ship on the _London's_ weather beam could not fire upon the
enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for the
flagship being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that she
was. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by the
_London's_ log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5.20,
when Hood (h) at last bore down with his division (h'), but the French
ships bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortly
after sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded; that
of the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed and
wounded.

Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into the
above account:--

"Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at
four, but at a most _improper_ distance, and our rear, being
barely within random shot, did not fire while the signal for
the line was flying. The _London_ had the signal for close
action flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at
_half a cable_ was under her topsails, with the main topsail
to the mast,[99] though the enemy's ships were pushing on."

As showing the improper distance at which the _London_ brought-to to
fire, he says:--

"The second ship astern of her (of the _London_) received
but trifling damage, and the third astern of her received no
damage at all, which most clearly proves [at] how much too
great a distance was the centre division engaged."

The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criticisms upon
it, which has been published. The gist of this is as follows. As the
French stood out, their line was not regular or connected. The van was
much separated from the centre and rear, and it appears also, from the
French narratives, that it was to windward of the rest of the fleet.
From these causes it was much exposed to be attacked unsupported.
There was, by Hood's estimate, "a full hour and a half to have engaged
it before any of the rear could have come up." The line of battle
on the port tack, with the then wind, was east and west, and Graves
had first ranged his fleet on it, as the French were doing; but
afterwards, owing to his method of approach, by the van bearing down
and the other ships following in its wake, the two lines, instead of
being parallel, formed an angle, the