he British _Princesa_ were shot away. Sir
Gilbert Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission
to be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "I
can aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we
approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside." It is
needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of
the bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails,
however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded
that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As
illustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It
was but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The
highest in any one ship was that of the _Duke_, 73 killed and wounded.
No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French loss
has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir Gilbert
Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that of
the _Ville de Paris_ alone to be 300. There being fifty-four hundred
troops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties
would be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this,
there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier's
words, "was certainly much more considerable" than that reported by
the British. Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against two
British out of thirty-six.

Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, which
accident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th. He
did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the order
for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at
1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised the
conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences
therefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which would
have applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without
surrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet
movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue this
command. Had it been done, he said:--

"I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the
enemy's ships before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only
under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at
others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the
afternoon, though the _flying_ enemy had a