ern; the sea was increasing;
if he got much further to leeward, he could not get back; he had
forgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the convoy might rejoin; a
night action, he considered, was not to be thought of. Yet, if he
let the enemy go, they might anticipate him at the Cape. In short,
Johnstone underwent the "anguish" of an undecided man in a "cruel
situation,"[141] and of course decided to run no risks. He returned
therefore to Porto Praya, put the captain of the _Isis_ under arrest,
and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren hurried on to the Cape,
got there first, landed his troops, and secured the colony against
attack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood some time later, and,
finding himself anticipated, turned aside to Saldanha Bay, where
he captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He then sent the _Hero_,
_Monmouth_, and _Isis_ on to India, to reinforce Hughes, and himself
went back to England.

No accusation of misbehavior lies against any of the British
subordinates in this affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the _Isis_
was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of all
the charges. The discredit of the surprise was not redeemed by any
exhibition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on the
part of the officer in charge. It has been said that he never had
commanded a post-ship[142] before he was intrusted with this very
important mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection for
it was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conduct
of Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance with the
administration.[143] His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, was
probably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British ships
of war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47
wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on board the
convoy, bringing up the total to 36 killed and 130 wounded. The French
admit 105 killed and 204 wounded, all but 19 being in the _Heros_ and
_Annibal_. Although precipitated by Suffren, the affair clearly was
as great a surprise to his squadron as to the British. Therefore, the
latter, being already at anchor and more numerous as engaged, had a
distinct advantage; to which also contributed musketry fire from the
transports. Nevertheless, the result cannot be deemed creditable to
the French captains or gunnery.

Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two months.
Then, having seen t