he day after the fight. The British Vice-Admiral
reported several ships much disabled, a great number of his
men--1,121--down with scurvy, and the water of the fleet very short.
He therefore thought it necessary to go to Madras, where he anchored
on the 25th. Suffren regained Cuddalore on the afternoon of the 23d.
His return and Hughes's departure completely changed the military
situation. The supply-ships, upon which the British scheme of
operations depended, had been forced to take flight when Suffren first
approached, and of course could not come back now. "My mind is on the
rack without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet," wrote
the commanding general on the 25th, "considering the character of M.
de Suffren, and the infinite superiority on the part of the French now
that we are left to ourselves."

[Illustration]

The battle of June 20th, 1783, off Cuddalore, was the last of the
maritime war of 1778. It was fought, actually, exactly five months
after the preliminaries of peace had been signed on January 20th,
1783. Although the relative force of the two fleets remained
unchanged, it was a French victory, both tactically and strategically:
tactically, because the inferior fleet held its ground, and remained
in possession of the field; strategically, because it decided the
object immediately at stake, the fate of Cuddalore, and with it,
momentarily at least, the issue of the campaign. It was, however, the
triumph of one commander-in-chief over another; of the greater man
over the lesser. Hughes's reasons for quitting the field involve the
admission of his opponent's greater skill. "Short of water,"--with
eighteen ships to fifteen, able therefore to spare ships by
detachments for watering, that should not have happened; "injury to
spars,"--that resulted from the action; "1,121 men short,"--Suffren
had embarked just that number--1,200--because Hughes let him
communicate with the port without fighting. Notwithstanding the
much better seamanship of the British subordinates, and their dogged
tenacity, Suffren here, as throughout the campaign, demonstrated again
the old experience that generalship is the supreme factor in war. With
inferior resources, though not at first with inferior numbers, by
a steady offensive, and by the attendant anxiety about Trincomalee
impressed upon the British admiral, he reduced him to a fruitless
defensive. By the seizure of that place as a base he planted himself
firmly upon