erica_ again wore and
followed her leaders, but the _Russell_ continued as she was, now
to windward of the French; by which course she was able to take a
conspicuous share in the closing scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the
van to tack, but the delay of an hour or more had given the _Russell_
a start over the other ships of her division "towards the enemy" which
could not be overcome.

The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the
weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French,
and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated
and disordered (Position 6). In the centre was the flagship _Ville de
Paris_ with five ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant,
was the van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles away
to leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again,
it was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships; and several
signals to this effect were made by de Grasse. They received but
imperfect execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough
in running before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exactitude of
position and of movement was unattainable to ships in various degrees
of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were
never again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken;
but the movement to leeward left the dismasted _Glorieux_, (g),
_Hector_, (h), and _Cesar_, (k), motionless between the hostile lines.

It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also
was divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This
is true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in two
respects. By favor of the wind, each of the three groups had been able
to maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of being
thrown entirely out, as the French were; and passing thus in column
along the _Glorieux_, _Hector_, and _Cesar_, they wrought upon these
three ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel among the
British vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships, as well as
the wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to be added a
demoralisation among the French crews, from the much heavier losses
resultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull. An officer
present in the action told Sir John Ross[121] afterwards that the
French fired very high throughout; and he cited in illustration that
the three trucks[122] of t