ch fleet in Fort Royal by means of
a chain of frigates.

The problem now immediately confronting de Grasse--the first step
towards the conquest of Jamaica--was extremely difficult. It was to
convoy to Cap Francois the supply vessels essential to his enterprise,
besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one hundred
and fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail of the
line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being fair,
he purposed to skirt the inner northern edge of the Caribbean Sea;
by which means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports,
wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need.

With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of April,
1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon his whole
fleet was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was evident the
vital importance of Barrington's conquest of Santa Lucia; for, had the
British been at Barbados, the most probable alternative, the French
movement not only would have been longer unknown, but pursuit would
have started from a hundred miles distant, instead of thirty. If the
British had met this disadvantage by cruising before Martinique, they
would have encountered the difficulty of keeping their ships supplied
with water and other necessaries, which Santa Lucia afforded. In
truth, without in any degree minimizing the faults of the loser, or
the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that followed, the
opening situation may be said to have represented on either side an
accumulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment of their
occurrence may have seemed individually trivial; a conspicuous warning
against the risk incurred by losing single points in the game of war.
De Grasse was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors
of his predecessors and of himself. That the British had Santa Lucia
as their outpost was due not only to Barrington's diligence, but also
to d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may be
questioned whether de Grasse himself had shown a proper understanding
of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of
Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the
year before. That the convoy was there to embarrass his movements,
may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was greatly
and entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six ships pursuing him,
twenty-one re