oth sides had eight ships in line, besides smaller
craft. The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, who
had one three-decked ship, three 74's, three 64's, and a 50; while
the French had one 84, two 74's, four 64's, and the late British
_Romulus_, 44. Because of this superiority, probably, the action was
considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the more
so because several vessels did not engage closely,--a fault laid to
the British admiral's failure to make the signal for close action,
hauling down that for the line. This criticism is interesting, for
it indicates how men's minds were changing; and it shows also that
Arbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the
century. The French commodore displayed very considerable tactical
skill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision.
With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer
intelligence and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution
to pursue his advantage. He probably could have controlled the
Chesapeake had he persisted.

His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who on the
10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the squadron.
This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical success,
continued thus:--

"As to the advantage which the English obtained, in fulfilling
their object, that is a necessary consequence of their
superiority, and, _still more_, of their purely defensive
attitude. _It is a principle in war that one should risk much
to defend one's own positions, and very little to attack
those of the enemy._ M. des Touches, whose object was purely
offensive, could and should, when the enemy opposed to him
superior forces, renounce a project which could no longer
succeed, unless, _contrary to all probability_, it ended
not only in beating but also in _destroying entirely_, that
superior squadron."

This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despairing
view of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain the
French want of success in this war. No matter how badly the enemy was
thrashed, unless he were entirely destroyed, he was still a fleet "in
being," a paralysing factor.

The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored to
the British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as he
knew that the British and French squadrons had sailed