t auxiliis assidendis_ ... placuit
supra-dictis praelatis et magnatibus ea esse in respectu, quousque
plenius consilium habuerimus, et tunc faciemus plurissime, tam de his
quam de aliis quae occurrerint emendanda, quae ad communem omnium
utilitatem pertinuerint, et pacem et statum nostrum et regni nostri."
This charter was made but twenty-four days after the death of John; and
we may agree with the committee (p. 77) in thinking it extraordinary
that these deviations from the charter of Runnymede, in such important
particulars, have been so little noticed. It is worthy of consideration
in what respects the provisions respecting the levying of money could
have appeared grave and doubtful. We cannot believe that the earl of
Pembroke, and the other barons who were with the young king, himself a
child of nine years old and incapable of taking a part, meant to abandon
the constitutional privilege of not being taxed in aids without their
consent. But this they might deem sufficiently provided for by the
charters of former kings and by general usage. It is not, however,
impossible that the government demurred to the prohibition of levying
scutage, which stood on a different footing from extraordinary aids; for
scutage appears to have been formerly taken without consent of the
tenants; and in the second charter of Henry III. there is a clause that
it should be taken as it had been in the time of Henry II. This was a
certain payment for every knight's fee; but if the original provision of
the Runnymede charter had been maintained, none could have been levied
without consent of parliament.

It seems also highly probable that, before the principle of
representation had been established, the greater barons looked with
jealousy on the equality of suffrage claimed by the inferior tenants _in
capite_. That these were constitutionally members of the great council,
at least in respect of taxation, has been sufficiently shown; but they
had hitherto come in small numbers, likely to act always in
subordination to the more potent aristocracy. It became another question
whether they should all be summoned, in their own counties, by a writ
selecting no one through favour, and in its terms compelling all to
obey. And this question was less for the crown, which might possibly
find its advantage in the disunion of its tenants, than for the barons
themselves. They would naturally be jealous of a second order, whom in
their haughtiness they held mu